From The Random House College Dictionary
The dictionary emphasizes a doctrine of teleology, which asserts that natural processes are determined or at least influenced by some intention on the part of nature. I am using "teleology" in a much weaker sense, as a category of concept rather than a doctrine. When I refer to "teleological" qualities, I mean qualities defined from the intended uses of things, rather than from their inherent essence. I don't care to argue whether those intentions may come from grander beings than humans, nor whether they affect behavior. I will argue that the concepts of computation, description, and information are mainly teleological in the sense above, and that we can understand and even predict many aspects of their behavior from their teleological qualities. But, this doesn't require that the teleological qualities cause this behavior; it's perfectly sensible to suppose that the teleological qualities and the behaviors are both the result of some common underlying causes. Would you say that I am proposing a sort of purely teleological value for the teleological point of view?