Protecting Anonymity in Dynamic Peer-to-Peer Networks
Krishna P. N. Puttaswamy
Alessandra Sala
Christo Wilson
Ben Y. Zhao
The 16th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2008)
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Paper Abstract
Peer-to-peer anonymous networks offer the resources to support today's
Internet applications. In today's dynamic networks, the key challenge to
these systems arises from node dynamics and failures that disrupt
anonymous routing paths, forcing them to be frequently rebuilt. Not only
do these path rebuilds interrupt application sessions, but they also
leak information to logging attacks such as the predecessor attack,
leading to significant degradation of anonymity over long sessions. In
this paper, we propose Bluemoon, a new anonymous protocol that provides
strong resilience against the predecessor attack through the use of
persistent anonymous links called hooks. When chained together,
these links create robust anonymous paths that avoid path disruptions
and rebuilds across node failures. Through detailed analysis, we show
that relative to prior approaches, Bluemoon provides significantly
stronger resistance against predecessor attacks. Finally, we implement
and deploy a prototype on both local and Internet-scale network
testbeds, and show that it provides high throughput even in high-load
environments such as PlanetLab.