Enigma CMSC 28400, Autumn 2021, Lecture 2

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


Reflector (*Umkehrwalze*, not visible)


Three rotors (*Walzen*)

Lightboard (output)







Plugboard (*Steckerbrett*)



Credit:Wikipedia user RadioFan, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en










1930s Enigma Setup (Changes each day)

- 1. Pick three rotors to use
- 2. Pick order for three rotors
- 3. Pick ring setting (rotate casing; changes turnovers)
- 4. Pick three initial rotor positions
- 5. Pick plugboard connections



Geheime Kommandosachel ,-

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Armee-Stabs-Maschinenschlüssel Nr. 28 für Oktober 1944

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Nicht ins Flugzoug mitnehmen

Data	m	Waltenlage			Ringstellung				e			Steck	ervet	rverbindungen					Kenngruppen			
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30	~ 1	IV	II	III	26	14	11	1.	ZN"	ro	GB	ER	DK	χU	GP	TV	SJ	LM	ino.	ud1	nam	lax
29	· · · · ·	IF	Y	IV	19	-09	24		ZU	HL	CQ	WM	0A	PY	EB	TR	DN .	VI	nci	oid	yhp	nip
28	· ·	IV	III	I	03	04	22		YT	BX	CV	ZN	UD	IR	5.1	HW	9A.	RQ	zqj	hlg	xky	ebt
27	ST 10 1	V	T	IV	20	06	18		KX	GJ	EP	AC	TB	HL	MW	QS	DV	0Z	bvo	sur	CCC	lge
26		IV	Ť	v	10	17	01	4	YV	GT	00	WN	FI	SK	LD	RP	MZ	BÙ	jhx	uuh	giw	ugw
25		V	IV	III	13	04	17		QR	GE	HA	NM	VS	WD	YZ	OF	XK	ŶΈ	tba	pnc	ukd	nld
24		IIT	II	IV	09	20	18	1	RS	NC	WK	60	YQ	AX	EH	VJ	ZL	PF	nti	mew	xbk	yes
23		V.	IT	THI	11	21	08		EY	DT	KF	MO	XP	HN	W9	ZL	IV	JA	lsd	nuo	vçr	VCX
22		T	II.		01	25	02		PZ	SE	OJ	XF	HA	GB	VQ	UY	KW	LR	y.ji	rwy	rdk	nso
21		IV.	T.	in	06	22	03		GH	JR	TQ	KF	NZ	IL	WM	BD	UÓ	EC ·	ema	mlv	Jjy	iqh
20		'v'	Ť	II	12	25	08		TF	BQ-	XV	UZ	PY	NL	WI	SJ	MÉ	GB a	xj1	pgs	ggh	zno
19	NY 11	IV .	III	TP	07	0.5	23		ZX	EC	AC	GD	KP	VO	25	NW	HL	RM	vpj	zqe	jŕs	cgi
18		II	III	¥.	19	14	12		WG	OM.	RL	DB.	.\$7.	44	P-2	- No. 4.	YN	IJ	oxá-		-ieu	-y t-
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15	- I	III	Î	Y	06	16	02	4	GT	YC	EJ	L'A	RX	FN	IS	WB	MH	ZV	bhe	x zm	yak	ev
14		TI	I	C v	23	05	24	4	AZ	CJ	WF	UY	SO	QV	MI	NH	DP	GX	fdx	tyj	bmq	ty
13		IV	IIk	1	03	25	10	1	CK	KN	JR	DQ	10	TL	HZ	MF	EP	WB	zfo	bjr	ZWX	gvi
12		I	III	II	26	01	18		QB	YE	WN	AI	GJ	TO	HR	FK	PS.		upe	auf	tkr	pw
11		v	T	inf -	17	1.4	19-4	1	SV	GO	FA	ZR	PN	HI	YM	WT	DE	BJ	vdh	ego	wmy	ut
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7		II	III	Ĩ	06	12	03		BG	FS	TH	JE	VK	P'E	CU.	QA	OD	NM	aty	mbb	mvo	jm
6		T	IV	v I	24	19	01	100	IR	HQ.	NT	WZ	VC	OY	GP	· LF	BX	AK .	bho	iwo	zgz	rn
5		TT		. HI -	05	22	14	81	MK	00	RQ	ХT	DW	IA	ZL	SY	PJ	EN	bok !	TZW	kzo*	ry
4		TV	TT	T III	15	02	21		KD	PG	CO	FW	HJ	RY	MT		VB.	ØZ	- kpk	php	xmc	pf
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2		II vi III I II	μν΄ II V III	v	13		01		DR	V.J	FS	\$K	TU	HX	AQ	GT	YÖ	FC	ppq	fqw	oiy	ru.
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
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Basic Enigma Usage: Encryption

- 1. Setup from key instructions
- 2. Type a letter
- 3. Board lights up with output letter, rotors move
- 4. Goto 2

Basic Enigma Usage: Decryption - The same!

- 1. Setup from key instructions
- 2. Type a letter
- 3. Board lights up with output letter, rotors move
- 4. Goto 2




Enigma Randomization: Message Keys

<u>Problem</u>: All senders would apply same permutation to first character, then same to second etc.

Solution: Use "message keys" that randomize the initial rotor positions for each message:

- 1. Setup from key instructions
- 2. Pick a random rotor position (say RTP)
- 3. Encrypt and send RTPRTP
- 4. Reset rotor positions to RTP
- 5. Send message as before



Today and Tomorrow: Rejewski's Attack



Polish Cipher Bureau achieved a complete break of this version of Enigma!

We will assume:

- **1.** We have captured many ciphertexts encrypted with the same day settings
- 2. We don't know any of the rotor wirings or day key settings

Our Goal: Recover message keys efficiently

We will only do one part of the attack; The entire attack involves many tedious steps.

The End