FCatch: Automatically Detecting Time-of-fault Bugs in Cloud Systems

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HUAWEI

Cloud Systems

Fault

- Component failure: node crashes and message drops



Faults are common



[1] Mesbahi and etc. Cloud Dependability Analysis: Characterizing Google Cluster Infrastructure Reliability. In ICWR-2017

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Merkle tree repair in Cassandra

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

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

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

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

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

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



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



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

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

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

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

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



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



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



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



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

Why fight TOF bug?

- Common in distributed system [1,2,3]
  - 32% distributed concurrency bugs [1]

[1] Leesatapornwongsa. TaxDC. In ASPLOS'16
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Why fight TOF bug?

- Common in distributed system [1,2,3]
- Difficult to avoid, expose and diagnose
  - Fault rarely occurs during in-house testing
  - Only trigger under special timing

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

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


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


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


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

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

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

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- Predict data flow changes caused by time-of-fault changes
- Consider both synchronization and fault-tolerance operations



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Evaluation

- Report 31 TOF bugs
  - 16 of them truly harmful

Outline

- Motivation
- Fault-aware logical time model
- FCatch tool
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

Overview



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

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

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

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

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

Traditional logical time model



Fault-aware logical time model

-- Crash VS. regular



Fault-aware logical time model

-- Crash VS. regular



Fault-aware logical time model

-- *Crash VS. regular*



New data flow between *Ncrash* and *Nregular* introduced by fault.

Fault-aware logical time model

-- *Crash VS. recovery*



Fault-aware logical time model

-- Crash VS. recovery



Fault-aware logical time model

Fault-aware logical time model

-- Crash VS. recovery



Fault-aware logical time model

-- Crash VS. recovery



Fault-aware logical time model

-- *Crash VS. recovery*



Data flow between *Ncrash* and *Nrecovery* is totally determined by TOF.

Fault-aware logical time model

-- *Crash VS. recovery*



Fault-tolerance: sanity check

```
//Recovery node
if (f.valid()) { //sanity check
  dt = f.read(); //read
}
```

Fault-aware logical time model





What are TOF bugs?

What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

What are TOF bugs?



What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W



What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W



Merkle tree repair in Cassandra



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Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W



Merkle tree repair in Cassandra



What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



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- *Fault timing:* before W
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

Crash-recovery

What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery



What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W



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

Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W



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

Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W



What are TOF bugs?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* Sanity check



Outline

- Motivation
- Our TOF bug model
- FCatch tool
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

FCatch overview

Step1: produce correct runs

- What are correct runs to observe?

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- What are correct runs to observe?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



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- What are correct runs to observe?



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Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



No faults need to be injected!

Step1: produce correct runs

- What are correct runs to observe?

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* sanity check



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

Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* sanity check



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

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* sanity check



Step2: identify conflicting operations

- Crash-regular TOF bug

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Step2: identify conflicting operations

- Crash-regular TOF bug
  - W & R are from different nodes (fault-free traces)
  - W & R have blocking happens-before relations

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



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

Step2: identify conflicting operations

- Crash-regular TOF bug
- Crash-recovery TOF bug

Step3: identify fault-tolerant ops

- Crash-regular TOF bug

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Step3: identify fault-tolerant ops

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Crash-regular

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


```
//Regular node
obj.wait(long timeout); //R: obj
```

Fault-tolerance mechanism: timeout

Step3: identify fault-tolerant ops

- Crash-regular TOF bug

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout




```
//Regular node
obj.wait(long timeout); //R: obj
```

Fault-tolerance mechanism: timeout

Sol: statically check *R*'s bytecode.

Step3: identify fault-tolerant ops

- Crash-regular TOF bug
- Crash-recovery TOF bug

Outline

- Motivation
- Our TOF bug model
- FCatch tool
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

Methodology

- Benchmarks
  - 7 real-world TOF bugs from TaxDC [1]
    - 3 crash-regular TOF bugs
    - 4 crash-recovery TOF bugs
  - 4 distributed systems

[1] Leesatapornwongsa. TaxDC. In ASPLOS'16

Overall results

	Crash-regular			Crash-recovery		
	#. Bench (harmful)	#. Unknown (harmful)	#. FP	#. Bench (harmful)	#. Unknown (harmful)	#. FP
CA1&2	2	1	0	-	0	2
HB-1	1	0	3	-	0	6
HB-2	-	2	2	1	2	0
MR-1	-	1	0	1	1	0
MR-2	-	1	0	2	1	0
ZK	-	0	0	1	0	2
Total	3	4	5	5	4	10

Overall results

	Crash-regular			Crash-recovery		
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HB-1	1	0	3	-	0	6
HB-2	-	2	2	1	2	0
MR-1	-	1	0	1	1	0
MR-2	-	1	0	2	1	0
ZK	-	0	0	1	0	2
Total	3	4	5	5	4	10

Overall results

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	#. Bench (harmful)	#. Unknown (harmful)	#. FP	#. Bench (harmful)	#. Unknown (harmful)	#. FP
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HB-1	1	0	3	-	0	6
HB-2	-	2	2	1	2	0
MR-1	-	1	0	1	1	0
MR-2	-	1	0	2	1	0
ZK	-	0	0	1	0	2
Total	3	4	5	5	4	10

Case study: an unknown harmful report



Case study: an unknown harmful report



Case study: an unknown harmful report

- MR-5485



Case study: an unknown harmful report

- MR-5485



- Readme, VM and scripts to reproduce each harmful report:

http://fcatch.cs.uchicago.edu/

Other results in our paper

- Random fault injection
- Performance overhead
- Crash-point sensitivity
- …

Outline

- Motivation
- Our TOF bug model
- FCatch tool
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

Take away

- TOF bugs are a timing problem.

Take away

- TOF bugs are a timing problem.
- Fault-aware logical time model.

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* Sanity check



Take away

- TOF bugs are a timing problem.
- Fault-aware logical time model.
- FCatch detects TOF bugs from correct runs.

Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* Sanity check



Crash-regular

- *Fault timing:* before W
- *Fault-tolerance:* timeout



Crash-recovery

- *Fault timing:* after W
- *Fault-tolerance:* Sanity check



Q&A

http://fcatch.cs.uchicago.edu/

DCatch: Automatically Detecting Distributed Concurrency Bugs in Cloud Systems

Thank you